Domestic Disorders: Suffrage and New York\u27s Constitutional Convention of 1867 by Batlan, Felice
5 
DOMESTIC DISORDERS: SUFFRAGE AND NEW YORK’S
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1867 
Felice Batlan* 
I first want to thank Tracy Thomas. Eight years ago we gathered at 
the University of Akron School of Law for the “New Faces of Women’s 
Legal History Conference,” and I have enjoyed being part of her many 
projects to create, propagate, and publicize women’s legal history.1  
What I love about her forthcoming book is how it positions Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton as a profound and original legal thinker and intellectual,2 
and it parallels my own work on later women legal activists and thinkers 
such as Florence Kelley and Sophonisba Breckinridge.3  We know that 
the field of legal history is still intellectually segregated, and we bang on 
the doors of the legal history cannon hoping that the historical figures 
that we study will be admitted to the pantheon of jurisprudential history. 
What I also deeply appreciate about Tracy’s book is its dialogue with 
authors who do not fully account for the real and material injuries of 
coverture as coverture functioned as both a material lived harm and an 
injury to dignity–what one of my colleagues calls a dignity taking.4 
Lisa’s work on the myth of Seneca Falls is also a tour de force in 
showing how messy and on the ground the campaign for women rights 
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was during the long nineteenth century.5  Like Lisa, my own work asks 
how and why history is written and what becomes masked in the 
process. 
In both Tracy and Lisa’s work we also see the crucial relationship 
between federalism and first wave feminists’ endless attempts to 
dismantle the structure of legal patriarchy. Indeed women’s fight for 
equality should be understood and taught as part of the history of 
federalism. As Tracy accounts, whether women could hold property or 
their own wages, seek a divorce, or even custody of children was 
dependent on state law. 
Here, I will be discussing New York State’s Constitutional 
Convention of 1867.  I argue that it is (at least in part) the outcome of 
this convention and the antagonisms that it created, which further 
propelled Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan Anthony to become aligned 
with the White Supremacist George Train.  It also shows the absolute 
mess of pursuing suffrage on a state by state basis and how legislators 
themselves equated the voting of African American men with women’s 
suffrage.  I am just beginning this project and hope to be in conversation 
with both the body of scholarship about Reconstruction in the North and 
a second body of scholarship on women’s history.6 
During the long summer of 1867, we might imagine that the 
Greeley household was anything but peaceful.  Horace Greeley, owner 
of the New York Tribune, abolitionist, and Republican politician, was 
Chairman of the Committee of Suffrage at the 1867 New York State 
Constitutional Convention in Albany.  Elizabeth Cady Stanton had long 
known the Greeleys and the Tribune had supported women’s suffrage 
before the war. The Committee was charged with making a 
recommendation on the issue of African American male suffrage and 
women’s suffrage. Where the Committee reported favorably on the 
former, it steadfastly rejected women’s suffrage.  As Greeley sat on the 
floor of the Albany convention, a petition from Mrs. Greeley was 
delivered in favor of women’s suffrage. As it was read out loud, laughter 
erupted throughout the hall.  During the course of the convention, 
petitions in support of women’s suffrage continued to arrive, disrupting 
talks of canals, taxes, and ordinary convention business.7 
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Contemporaries viewed the convention as a disaster. It drew to a 
close only after nine months in which the delegates were unable to agree 
upon almost anything, from who should have the vote, to the per diem 
stipend, to whether the windows should be opened, to the legality of the 
convention itself.8  It even began in the wake of a cold blooded murder. 
L. Harris Hiscock was an assembly man from Syracuse and a convention 
delegate. As he left his Albany hotel and headed to the opening 
proceedings of the convention, George Cole, his dear friend, shot him at 
point blank range. Cole defended his actions as an honor murder 
claiming that Hiscock had seduced his wife and perhaps attempted to 
rape her while Cole was fighting with the Union army.9 
The Greeley and Hiscock matters are related.  Both highlight an 
issue that haunted the convention—what was the relationship between 
the domestic sphere and the properly ordered state? Greeley’s household 
appeared patently disordered as his wife seemed to usurp male privilege 
and exercise an agency that subverted Greeley’s status as a household 
head who exercised control over his family. Cole’s act of murder was an 
attempt to reestablish his right to his wife’s body and to his role as 
family protector.  These stories function as metaphor for the larger issue 
at the convention of African American male and women’s suffrage. 
When discussing suffrage, the delegates did so using a discourse of 
manhood and the proper ordering of the household. For them, the state’s 
political order was intimately linked to domestic order and within this 
equation stood the very question of what it meant to be a man and a 
citizen. The political and domestic economy were thus mapped on to 
each other. Moreover, delegates continually confronted the question of 
whether voting was a civil, political, or social right and their decisions 
would have long-lasting implications. 
A little background is necessary. The 1777 New York Constitution 
provided that any man could vote for the lower house of the legislative 
assembly if he possessed a $50 freehold, rented a $5 tenement, or had 
been a freeman in Albany in 1777 or New York City in 1775. To vote 
for senator or governor required a $250 freehold.  In practice, public 
officials allowed their friends and acquaintances of good character to 
vote regardless of the property qualification. Although prima facie 
racially neutral, in reality the qualification bore more heavily upon 
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African American men who may not have been freemen in those years, 
did not own property, and were not friendly with election officials. 
Historians dub the 1820s the age of Jacksonian Democracy, as state 
after state instituted universal white male suffrage.  Although this is 
rightly celebrated, often neglected is the manner in which African 
American male suffrage actually contracted during the period.  New 
York State stands as a perfect example.  In 1821, New York held a 
constitutional convention for the primary purpose of enlarging the 
franchise. The result was the elimination of the property qualification for 
white men.  African American men, however, now had to possess a $250 
freehold on which they paid taxes to qualify to vote.  Interestingly, the 
provision also stated that an African American male, unless qualified to 
vote, could not be directly taxed. 
Such provision disenfranchised all but a small number of African 
American men. In 1825, only 298 African-American men in a total 
population of 29,701 possessed the requisite freehold.  The role of 
taxation here is complicated.  On the one hand, if we think of taxation as 
an obligation of citizenship, most African American men were entirely 
excluded—not  worthy of even being taxed and therefore constructed as 
standing outside the community.  On the other hand, women were taxed 
but could not claim suffrage rights.  Twice, first in 1846 and later in 
1860, New York held popular referendums to remove the property 
qualification for African American men. Despite the active campaigns 
that African American men’s organizations launched, both referendums 
suffered resounding defeats at the polls.10 
At least one of the reasons that the 1867 convention had been called 
was to eliminate this property qualification. Why the Republican 
administration led by Governor Reuben Fenton wanted to do this 
appears to be some combination of principles and politics.  Eleven 
thousand new African American voters, who it was assumed would vote 
Republican, could have boosted the Republican Party to victory as the 
state was often evenly split between Democrats and Republicans. 
Furthermore, some argued that, for emancipation and Union victory 
truly to take hold in the South, African American male suffrage was 
crucial.  Others argued that New York should provide a model for 
southern states.  Finally a minority believed in the importance of equal 
political rights for men.  But what about women? 
Months before the convention began, the question arose as to who 
10. QUIGLEY, supra note 5, at 54-55; Erika Wood & Liz Budnitz, Brennan Center for Justice, 
Jim Crow in New York, at http://brennan.3cdn.net/50080b21f7f0197339_z7m6i20ud.pdf.  
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would have the right to vote for delegates. Radical Republicans argued 
that African American males should have such rights, and a smaller 
group insisted that both women and African Americans should be 
allowed to vote for delegates. Needless to say neither African American 
men nor women were allowed to vote for convention delegates.  An 
attempted bid by Fredrick Douglass to be even nominated as a 
Republican delegate was decisively rejected by the Republican Party. 
The question of who could vote for delegates went to the incredible 
inequity of only white men deciding whether the franchise would be 
expanded. 
In the assembly chamber in Albany, on the afternoon of January 23, 
1867, Elizabeth Cady Stanton then fifty-two years old with her 
trademark crown of white curls and swathed in yards of dark silk, stood 
and addressed a packed assembly. Stanton by this time was nationally 
recognized as one of the leaders of the women’s rights movement.11 
Although there is no record of Stanton’s inner thoughts as she addressed 
the New York assembly on that January day, we can assume that she felt 
quite comfortable. As Tracy’s work makes so clear, Stanton had spoken 
in front of the New York legislature multiple times including advocating 
for women’s property rights and the end of coverture.12 
Stanton began with the basic argument that women were taxed 
without representation and compared this with African American men 
who were not taxed since they were denied the franchise.13 She also 
demonstrated the absurdity of a classification that assumed all African 
Americans were male by relating the story of a wealthy African 
American woman who paid substantial taxes yet still was prevented 
from voting.  In other words, this woman was classified as a woman for 
purposes of taxation and suffrage but she was equally African American. 
Through these examples, Stanton demonstrated that New York’s 
suffrage rules were inconsistent as well as over- and under-inclusive. 
Most importantly she repeatedly viewed African American male 
suffrage and woman’s suffrage as inherently linked. 
Stanton was already familiar with the argument that women’s 
suffrage would destroy the home.  Citing the example of New Jersey 
where women and African American males voted until 1806 (at which 
time they were disenfranchised), she replied, perhaps somewhat tongue 
and cheek: “Did the men of that period become mere satellites of the 
11. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, “Address in Favor of Universal Suffrage, for the Election of
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention,” Jan. 23, 1867. 
12. Thomas, supra note 2, chap. 2. 
13. Id. 
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dinner-pot, the wash-tub, or the spinning wheel? Were they dwarfed and 
crippled? Did the children spring Minerva-like, from the brains of their 
fathers?”14  In this statement, we can observe some of the fears that anti-
suffragists possessed and expounded.  Anti-suffragists raised the 
question of how the vote would affect women’s domestic role.  If the 
very nature of the vote was public and political, would it woo women 
away from the domestic sphere, which was conceptualized as private 
and apolitical? Could the vote make women into men and men into 
women?  What would it mean for the power dynamics between a 
husband and wife if they were to disagree publicly over political 
questions as the Greeleys did? 
As the convention proper proceeded, the question of universal 
suffrage was raised repeatedly and some of the leading suffrage activists 
such as Lucy Stone spoke at the convention. The painful splits that 
would affect  the women’s suffrage movement had not yet become fully 
inscribed.  Universal suffrage was still a possibility.  Yet when Greeley’s 
Committee reported on the issue, it recommended against women’s 
suffrage.  The report reads in part: “We are satisfied that public 
sentiment does not demand and would not sustain such an innovation so 
revolutionary and sweeping, so openly at war with a distribution of 
duties and functions between the sexes as venerable and pervading as 
government itself, and involving transformations so radical in social and 
domestic life.”15  Women’s suffrage was understood as not simply a 
political right but one that would have implications in the very ordering 
of every-day domestic life, and indeed the social hierarchies upon which 
society was built.  On the convention floor, the legal reforms that women 
had achieved such as the married women’s property acts, which Tracy’s 
book discusses in length, came under question as perhaps a mistake. One 
delegate asserted that such acts destroyed the eloquence of the common 
law and brought in foreign legal elements such as the Napoleonic code 
and Louisiana’s civil law, indicating that women’s rights were not quite 
right for real Americans.  Others argued that New York citizens were on 
a dangerous slippery slope; first came the married women’s property 
acts, women’s suffrage would be next, and then women would have 
ambitions to be jurors, attend law school, work on stock exchanges, and 
run for elective office. This would injure women themselves, the family, 
and ultimately the state.  From where did this right to women’s suffrage 
arise some asked and then answered, certainly not nature as women’s 
14. Id. at 16. 
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2016] DOMESTIC DISORDERS 11 
true nature was to be in the home.16 
With women’s suffrage essentially a dead letter, attention turned to 
African American male suffrage. Yet as can be seen from the debates, 
African American and women’s suffrage remained knotted together.17 
Proponents of African American male suffrage argued for it on a number 
of grounds.  Some claimed that voting itself was an inalienable right of 
the individual and that the Declaration of Independence proclaimed all 
men as created equal.18  Opponents responded that suffrage was a 
political privilege constructed by society as evidenced by the fact that 
women were individuals but could not vote. Thus where the Radical 
Republicans were willing to separate the question of African American 
male suffrage and women’s suffrage, opponents were not.19 
In response to Democrats’ opposition, some Radical Republicans 
narrowed their argument and claimed that voting was an inherent right 
not of the individual but of “manhood.”20  But who possessed such 
requisite manhood?  Some argued that African American men inherently 
possessed manhood. Others argued that African American men had 
demonstrated their manhood by fighting for the Union. Having proved 
their manhood on the battlefield, they now were entitled to the ballot, 
which was the very essence of manhood.21 Yet Democrats countered 
even this argument by citing the role that women performed for the 
Union as nurses on the battlefield. In part, anti-suffragists were now 
using the very arguments that were raised by suffragists, as to why 
women were entitled to vote, to defeat African American male 
suffrage.22 
 As the convention continued, the tensions in the definition of 
manhood, who could claim it and what it meant, was debated with fetish 
like attention. Indeed the very concept of manhood seemed to be falling 
apart.23 Repeatedly, delegates claimed that political equality for African 
American men would lead to social equality. Social equality was a code 
word for African American men (and it was always men) having sex –
and children—with white women.24  If at least part of the definition of 
manhood was based upon access to and control of white women, would 
16. See, e.g., Proceedings and Debates, supra note 7, at 429-44. 
17. Documents of the Convention, supra note 15, at 4-11. 
18. Id. at 4. 
19. Proceedings and Debate, supra note 7, at 241-20. 
20. Id. at 272. 
21. Id. at 270-22. 
22. Id. at 256-60.
23. Id. at 213, 241-26. 
24. Proceedings and Debate, supra note 7, at 213, 241-56. 
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African American men’s admission to manhood result in sexual access 
to white women thereby defeating white manhood? Moreover, as some 
implied, if women were given the vote, manhood itself would unravel as 
manly women unmade manhood. Only white women firmly ensconced 
within the home could confer true manhood.25 
Other delegates attempted to pull apart the question of political and 
social equality, arguing that political equality was a question for the 
legislature and that social relations were supervised by the man in his 
home.  Indeed, the dominant role of a man over his household was 
divine, and women’s suffrage would destroy the home’s perfect ordering 
depriving children of their mothers and husbands of their wives.26  In 
part, the power of the white man to supervise his home was one of the 
focal points of the debate regarding African American male suffrage and 
women’s suffrage.  Suffrage in each case threatened white male control 
of wives and daughters, who they feared would abandon domestic tasks, 
challenge the power of their husbands and fathers, and marry or engage 
in illicit affairs with newly empowered African American men. Like the 
South following the Civil War, New York legislatures embraced this 
trope of the over-sexed black man who could not be entrusted with the 
vote.  Indeed the very debate regarding African American male suffrage 
came to map earlier pro-slavery arguments about the capacity, 
intelligence, and loyalty of African Americans which would continue 
well into the civil rights era. Finally, through debates about the exclusion 
of women and African Americans from suffrage, the vote came to be 
understood as simply a privilege and not a right.27  Such a privilege 
could thus lawfully be denied and restricted. 
Horace Greeley, following the convention, reasserted his public 
power. According to Stanton, although the Tribune often had published 
articles favoring women’s rights, it ceased to do so.  In the end, New 
York’s white male voters rejected removal of the property qualification 
for African American men and it was only with the adoption of the 
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 that it was eliminated..  Those fighting for 
women’s suffrage moved on to the state of Kansas and the halls of 
Congress. Stanton and Anthony’s speeches increasingly took on strains 
of white supremacy as they argued that educated white women were 
more qualified to vote than African American men. Yet as the 1867 
proceedings demonstrate, African American male suffrage and women’s 
25. Id. at 429-44. 
26. Id. at 429-36. 
27. Id. at 436-40. 
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suffrage were still deeply linked. 
